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Comments 
and Discussion 
Stanley  Fischer: Each  of the four  papers  in  this symposium  is extremely 
convincing  on many  points. But they differ  on the central  issue, whether 
we should  return  to fixed  exchange  rates-or  their  judicious  equivalent, 
target zones for exchange rates. My comments will be directed to 
uncovering  and evaluating  the judgments  that lead the authors  to their 
different  conclusions. I conclude in agreement  with the Branson-Dorn- 
busch team, though  not for identical  reasons, that  target  zones are not a 
good idea. 
Table 1 summarizes the positions of the papers on the two key 
questions  isolated  by Rudiger  Dornbusch.  The  agnostic  entries  represent 
positions taken in the papers for this symposium, not necessarily the 
views of the authors  expressed on other  occasions. 
Here are the five points in the papers  on which we should  agree and 
on which I believe all four  authors  agree. 
-Nominal  and  real  exchange  rates  have fluctuated  a great  deal in the 
past thirteen  years, far  more  than  the proponents  of flexible  rates would 
have predicted. 
-Real  exchange  rate  appreciations  bring  protectionist  pressures  that 
are  potentially  destructive  of one of the major  achievements  of the post- 
World  War II era-the  restoration  of world trade to the levels of the 
1920s. 
-From  William  Branson  we see that manufacturing  output  is, other 
things being equal, negatively correlated  with the real exchange rate, 
"other  things"  being  trend,  the real  price  of energy,  and  the employment 
ratio. This is evidence that a less valuable  dollar  in the past five years 
would have produced  a different  composition  of U.S. output-and  the 
point extends to agriculture  and the likelihood that the farm problem 
would  have been less severe. 
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Table 1.  Anatomy of Exchange Rate Policy Positions 
Exchange  markets function  efficiently 
Yes  Agnostic  No 
Manage  Yes  Cooper  Williamson 
rates 
directly  No  Branson  Dornbusch  ... 
-From  Branson  and  Dornbusch,  formally,  and  from  Richard  Cooper, 
less formally, we see that the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch  model ac- 
counts for the real appreciation  of the dollar  in the past five years as the 
inevitable result of the world policy mix of tight fiscal policy abroad, 
loose fiscal  policy in the United States, and  tight  monetary  policy in the 
Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and  Development. 
-Exchange  market  intervention  by itself, in the form of jawboning 
(Cooper)  or sterilized intervention,  would not be powerful enough to 
reduce exchange rate fluctuations  substantially.  At the least, monetary 
policy would have to  be  exchange-rate oriented; at best,  in John 
Williamson's  world, fiscal policies would be better coordinated  than 
they are now. 
Remarkably,  the authors'  policy views are nonetheless different,  as 
outlined  below. 
Branson:  The  exchange  rate  has  been reacting  appropriately  to policy. 
There  is no prospect  of fiscal  policy coordination,  without  which mone- 
tary  policy can do little. What  can  be achieved  is best done  through  quiet 
diplomacy  among  the central  banks. A new Bretton Woods would fail 
not only for lack of political  will to coordinate  policies, but also for lack 
of the analytical  ability  to calculate  appropriate  exchange  rates. 
Cooper:  This  paper  is less a discussion  of target  zones than  the others 
and more a discussion of the U.S. policy mix. Cooper argues that the 
mix has been a disaster  for many  firms  and workers  in goods-producing 
sectors, including  agriculture.  The U.S. debt, internal  and  external,  is a 
major  problem  for the longer term. The United States should steadily 
tighten  its fiscal  policy, compensating  with  monetary  expansion,  to drive 
down the dollar. Jawboning  helps, and the exchange rate initiatives  of 
September  1985  were appropriate  and  useful. 
Dornbusch:  There is substantial  agreement  with Branson's views, 
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Table  2. Explaining  Exchange  Rate Policy  Positions 
Exchange  markets  function efficiently 
Yes  No 
Yes  Target  zones will constrain  Target  zones can reduce excess 
Manage  government  policy.  volatility  and will constrain 
government  policy.  rates  No  Markets  work fine, but target  Capital  flows are unstoppable, 
directly  zones will not constrain  and target  zones will not 
government  policy.  constrain  government  policy. 
coordination.  Dornbusch  believes that the best that can be hoped for at 
present  is ad  hoc intervention,  in  the  form  of monetary  policy  intervention 
or taxes on capital flows or both. He does not express a preference 
between the Tobin  tax on all international  capital  flows and the type of 
tax on capital  inflows  used by the Israelis  in 1979-81  to try to prevent  an 
attempted  disinflation  from producing  too large  an appreciation.  Dorn- 
busch argues that international  capital flows are motivated in large 
measure  by tax evasion rather  than  any socially useful  purpose. 
Williamson: Williamson  wants  the dollar  to move another  10  percent. 
The world  needs exchange  rate  target  zones, agreed  to by a formal  group 
consisting  of the major  industrial  countries  and  the International  Mone- 
tary Fund. They will figure  out zones that produce  basic balance  in the 
current  account in the medium  term. The zones would be 10 percent 
above and  below the targets,  and soft at the edges, which must mean 12 
percent  and harder  at the edges. The targets  would  be achieved through 
monetary  policy. Williamson's  paper  substantially  advances  the discus- 
sion by including  an interesting  collection of supporting  judgments  that 
reveal why he differs  from the other panelists on the feasibility of the 
target  zone approach.  His most important  judgment  is that fiscal policy 
is not necessarily  independent  of exchange  rate  regimes. 
How can such sensible people differ?  Table 2 summarizes  the judg- 
ments that divide them, using a scheme similar  to that used in table 1. 
None of the four boxes can be ruled  out a priori. If target  zones could 
restrain  inappropriate  government  policy-and in  the  mid-eighties  thoughts 
turn  to fiscal  policy-there  would  be no contradiction  between  believing 
that exchange markets  are efficient and believing that target  zones are 
desirable. A person with those views would occupy the top left box. 
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governments  will be constrained  by target  zones and that the exchange 
markets are inefficient. In the bottom left-hand corner we find the 
essence of the Branson view, which is that the exchange markets  are 
efficient  and  that  governments  will not be constrained  by exchange  rate 
targets.  I would  place myself  in the bottom  right-hand  box, doubting  that 
the exchange markets  are efficient,  but believing  that governments  will 
not be constrained  by target  zones and that the zones could not in any 
event withstand  the capital  flows that  now move about  the international 
financial  system. 
The key judgments  that are being made here are on the questions of 
whether governments  will be constrained  by exchange rate rules and 
whether  capital  flows can be withstood.  And underlying  those questions 
is the basic issue that William  Branson  emphasizes, whether  we would 
be better  off if exchange  rates were more stable. The answer  is yes only 
if there is indeed excess volatility of exchange rates and governments 
have sufficient  knowledge  to choose the right  rates, and if more stable 
fiscal policies are appropriate  and we can constrain governments to 
follow such policies through  exchange  rate  rules. 
In deciding  where to stand  on these issues, it is useful to draw  on the 
lessons of the breakdown  of Bretton Woods and of the existence and 
operation  of the European  Monetary  System. 
Given that the Bretton  Woods system lasted well over twenty years, 
the target  zone system cannot  be dismissed  out of hand.  The question  is 
what the breakdown  of the Bretton  Woods system tells us about target 
zones.  One lesson is that fiscal and monetary policies can diverge 
internationally  even under tightly fixed exchange rates. It could be 
argued that was possible only because the United States was  not 
constrained  under  Bretton Woods-but  there is no reason to think the 
United States would  agree  to be constrained  this time around  either. 
The Bretton Woods system became progressively  less stable as the 
strength and volume of private capital flows increased. The second 
important  lesson is that it is very difficult  to manage  a fixed exchange 
rate system when there  are free private  capital  flows. 
The European  Monetary  System was slighted  in the four papers we 
had  in this session. That  institution  operates  substantially  the way John 
Williamson  wants the international  economy to operate. It has target 
zones. Rudiger  Dornbusch  remarks  that  the EMS is merely  the German 
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countries  are voluntarily  in that union. The governments  of France  and 
Italy find  it politically  useful to operate  under  the constraint  of German 
monetary  policy. Thus the EMS provides some evidence in favor of the 
view that  exchange  rate  targets  would constrain  government  policies. 
But  there  is another  lesson from  the EMS. Capital  controls  have been 
needed to keep the French  and Italian  exchange  rates in line. Both Italy 
and France  operate  exchange controls, which, although  not watertight, 
are tightened  when a change  in the exchange  rate looks imminent.  That 
again  suggests  that  capital  flows will be a key to the operation  of a target 
zone system. 
What should we conclude from all this? First, there is a question of 
how agreement  will be reached on a desirable basic current account 
balance  for each country. Richard  Cooper  and John Williamson  talk as 
if the United States should  have a balanced  current  account. That  is not 
a good idea if Latin  America  is trying  to pay off its debt. Agreement  on 
the underlying  balances  will not be an easy matter. 
Second, the big bands  around  the targets  are a sales device. William- 
son'  s targets  are miragelike.  The zone is ten percent  wide, but when you 
get close to the edge, you can readjust  the target,  and, besides, it is soft 
at the edges. If the target  zones mean anything,  there will come a time 
when domestic policy has to be readjusted  and exchange rates have to 
be defended, for monetary  policy will not be able to withstand  capital 
flows unless there  is an appropriate  policy adjustment.  It is at that  point 
that countries have to decide whether they want to subordinate  their 
monetary  or fiscal  policies to the defense of the exchange  rate. 
Will they do it? For the United States the answer is no. When push 
comes to shove, the U.S. Congress  is not going  to change  fiscal policy, 
or anything  that matters to its constituents, in order to maintain  the 
exchange rate. Ask yourself whether the target zones  could have 
withstood the Reagan revolution, which is implicitly what is being 
argued.  Or  do you believe the United States would  have negotiated  with 
its trading  partners  for permission  to move the exchange  rate so it could 
undertake  the massive Reagan tax cuts without violating the targets? 
The United  States  will not operate  that  way. Target  zones are  not a likely 
prospect  in the United States, Germany,  or Japan. 
Instead we are moving at present toward a three-currency-block 
world. Europe  is happy  to operate  in the EMS, which Britain  may soon 
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Dornbusch  mode: there will be occasions when it is perfectly obvious 
that exchange rates are out of line and when they can be nudged  back 
into line with monetary  policy or with direct intervention.  But mostly 
the blocks will operate  independently,  running  their  own monetary  and 
fiscal policy, meeting  every now and then to try to persuade  the others 
to change policy, and occasionally surprising  everyone by agreeing  on 
the directions  in which exchange rates should move and succeeding in 
moving  them. 
General Discussion 
Rudiger Dornbusch reiterated his view that the most compelling 
reason for targeting  exchange rates has to be the belief, which he does 
not share, that the existence of target zones would force national 
governments  to adopt more responsible fiscal and monetary  policies. 
Otherwise,  either  the target  zones would have to be adjusted  frequently 
to accommodate  bad  policy or the target  zone system would  break  down 
entirely. Robert Gordon  noted that exchange rate targeting  would not 
have affected U.S.  fiscal policy during the early 1980s because that 
policy was pursued  on the grounds  that it would produce  falling  deficits 
and interest rates. The large budget deficits actually experienced  were 
not predicted  by those responsible  for the policy. 
William  Branson  commented  that the so-called misalignment  of the 
dollar  in recent years was in fact an equilibrium  reaction  to the change 
in U. S. fiscal  policy  under  Reagan.  The  exchange  rate  movement  brought 
about  the large  U.S. trade  deficit  that made  room  for the increase in the 
U.S.  structural  budget deficit. William  Nordhaus  challenged  the view 
that  the appreciation  of the dollar  could  be attributed  solely to U.S. fiscal 
policy. The dollar began to appreciate  after the third  quarter  of 1980. 
But the first  credible  forecast  of large  budget  deficits  did  not appear  until 
the Congressional  Budget  Office's February  1982  report.  He concluded 
that the explanation  for the pre-1982  rise in the dollar  must  be traced  to 
the October  1979  shift  in monetary  regime  and  its effect on interest  rates. 
John Williamson  acknowledged  that much, though not all, of the ex- 
change  rate  movement  was a rational  response to U.S. macroeconomic 
policies. But, he argued, that does not mean that those policies would 
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Walter  Salant observed that target zones have been criticized both 
for being too flexible compared  with fixed rates and for being too rigid 
compared  with flexible rates. But he noted that this implies that they 
have the corresponding  advantages  of being less rigid  than fixed rates 
and  less volatile  than  flexible  rates. The  difficult  political  choice between 
stabilizing  domestic policy and keeping the exchange rate on target 
would come up less frequently  under a zone system than under fixed 
rates, especially if the zones were adjustable.  And the risks of bubbles 
and  excessive volatility  would be less under  a zone system than  under  a 
flexible system. In short, target zones would share the advantages  as 
well as the disadvantages  of both fixed and flexible rates. Dornbusch 
suggested that one reason why target zones have not attracted  more 
political  support  is that they are not extreme  enough. He predicted  that 
any move away from  floating  rates would be back to fixed rates, not to 
an intermediate  system. Dornbusch  conceded that  a target  zone system 
would have the advantage of providing  a forum for open discussion 
among countries about appropriate  exchange rates. In a floating  rate 
system, such  discussion  is unlikely  to occur  on any  ongoing  basis  because 
the market determines exchange rates; in a fixed rate system, such 
discussion is avoided for fear it might provoke speculation. William 
Poole reflected  that soft target  zones would work  just as money growth 
targets  have: they would be ignored  when it was convenient. 
Some participants  believed that exchange rate fluctuations  could be 
excessive under  floating  rates and discussed taxing  capital  movements 
as a way to reduce  erratic  fluctuations.  James  Tobin  commented  that  the 
basic  rationale  for  taxing  exchange  transactions  was to discourage  short- 
term  capital  movements  without  impeding  long-term  investments.  With 
such  a transactions  tax, short-term  interest  rates  would  not be so closely 
arbitraged  across countries, so that governments would have more 
policy autonomy.  In  Tobin's  view, a tax on exchange  transactions  would 
be useful  not only with  floating  rates  but  also under  a target  zone or fixed 
rate regime, in that it would reduce the need to make exceptions or to 
change rates. However, Williamson  argued that reducing short-term 
capital  flows could  cause dynamic  instability  of the exchange  rate  under 
either a floating  rate or target  zone system because it would hinder  the 
capital  flows needed to finance  trade. He also noted that a transactions 
tax would not prevent currency  misalignments  coming  from long-term 
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the United States. Stanley Fischer believed that a tax on exchange 
transactions  would  be desirable  for  the  reasons  Tobin  gave, but  he argued 
that it would not work because foreign exchange transactions  would 
merely be driven offshore. Nordhaus suggested that someone should 
look at whether day-to-day exchange rate volatility has changed as 
transactions  costs have changed;  his suspicion  was that  it has not. Poole 
drew an analogy  to the real estate market,  where transactions  costs are 
very high. There is little day-to-day  volatility in land prices, but high 
transactions costs  have not prevented price movements that some 
observers  believe to be speculative  bubbles. 
Dornbusch  expressed concern  over the consequences of implement- 
ing  a target  zone system  in the current  economic  environment.  He feared 
that those who favor target  zones implicitly  seek a large  further  depre- 
ciation  of the dollar.  Rather  than  adopting  such  a "beggar-thy-neighbor" 
policy that  would export  unemployment  abroad,  he would  prefer  to see 
the United States and other countries  take coordinated  steps to lower 
interest  rates. Richard  Cooper  agreed  with the need to lower worldwide 
interest  rates but argued  that the target  zone proposals  were a systemic 
reform  and should  not be evaluated  as a current  policy issue. Any target 
zone system would take at least three years to implement;  by then, the 
economic environment  could look quite different. Dornbusch  replied 
that target  zones could not be divorced  from a current  policy context. 
When they were first discussed seriously three years ago, they would 
have implied  a policy of monetizing  the huge impending  U.S. budget 
deficits. Not having  target  zones permitted  a different  adjustment  to the 
deficit. 
Several  participants  discussed the longer  run  effects of large  fluctua- 
tions in exchange  rates. Branson  noted that, in response to the dollar's 
real appreciation  during  the early 1980s, both foreign and U.S. firms 
developed sources of supply outside the United States in industries  in 
which  the  United  States  had  previously  been  competitive  internationally. 
With these foreign sources established, some of the U.S. employment 
in those industries  lost to foreign  competition  in recent  years will not be 
recouped  even if the dollar  falls  back  to 1980  levels. Williamson  observed 
that the existence of  such irreversible effects from exchange rate 
fluctuations  strengthens  the case for  target  zones. Nordhaus,  by contrast, 
observed  that  exchange  rate  fluctuations  that  lead  to shakeouts  in certain 
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such fluctuations  might contribute  to the economy's long-run  perfor- 
mance,  just as Schumpeter  reasoned  that  business cycles did. 
Robert  Lawrence  suggested  that Branson's  estimates  of the effect of 
exchange  rates on employment  might  be too large  because they assume 
a constant employment-exchange  rate elasticity. In fact, as a currency 
increases in value, exports of products with a high demand  elasticity 
drop  off first,  and  the volume  of exports  in the products  that  remain  may 
be relatively  insensitive  to the exchange  rate. This seems to explain  why 
the volume of U.S. exports held up during  the last stages of the dollar's 
appreciation.  Charles Schultze noted that Branson's estimate of 1.7 
million U.S. jobs lost because of the dollar  appreciation  did not allow 
for the volume of defense production,  which also has important  effects 
on manufacturing  employment. Over the past fifteen years, defense 
spending has moved inversely with the dollar exchange rate, so that 
including it in the model might increase the estimated effect of the 
exchange  rate  on manufacturing  employment. 